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In the last year, much attention has been focused on the
Supreme Court's recent, restrictive interpretations of federal civil
rights legislation.1 These decisions will increase the difficulties
women and minorities face in proving and remedying employment
discrimination. No less significant, however, are those decisions
minimizing the amount of fees attorneys can expect to recover
should their clients eventually succeed in proving a civil rights vio-
lation.2 By diminishing the economic incentives for attorneys to
take these cases, the Court has increased the chances that a civil
rights plaintiff will not be able to obtain effective legal representa-
tion. In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc. ,3 the Court con-
tinued this trend, possibly dealing a "lethal blow" to many civil
* B.A., Brooklyn College (1970); J.D., Washington University School of Law
(1981); Supervisory Staff Attorney, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1987 to
present).
** A.B., The University of Michigan (1983); J.D., Case Western Reserve School
of Law (1987); Staff Attorney, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1987-89); Judicial
Clerkship, United States District Court Judge William L. Hungate (1989-90).
1. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (limiting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1982) to racial discrimination in actual making and enforcement of contract;
on-the-job harassment not covered); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
2261 (1989) (requiring employees to file a complaint with Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission when seniority system with alleged discriminatory purpose
is adopted, even if employee is not actually harmed at that time); Martin v. Wilks,
109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (allowing job applicants not represented in fair employment
case to bring action later to challenge changes resulting from litigation or decree);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (requiring Title VII plain-
tiffs who allege disparate impact to prove discrimination by isolating specific em-
ployment practices causing disparity).
2. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711 (1987) (rejecting contingency nature of litigation as support for bonus or fee en-
hancement except in limited circumstances); Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S.
234 (1985) (disallowing recovery of fees for time spent in optional administrative
proceedings); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (eliminating novelty and com-
plexity as factors to be considered in enhancing fee award); Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424 (1983) (elevating to critical importance degree of plaintiff's success).
3. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
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rights cases.4
The Court in Crawford limited a prevailing federal litigant's
recovery of expert witness fees under 28 U.S.C. § 19205 to the $30-
per-day cap set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b).6 This amount, of
course, represents a small fraction of the actual cost of expert wit-
nesses. One concurring and two dissenting Justices tried to mini-
mize Crawford's effect by specifically stating that the Court's
opinion did not reach the question of whether a prevailing civil
rights litigant could recover the full cost for expert witnesses
under the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.7
This article reviews Crawford and canvasses the post-Craw-
ford decisions addressing the question of recovery of witness fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Several of these decisions conclude that, in
light of Crawford, the $30-per-day cap applies to recovery of ex-
pert witness fees under Section 1988.8 Other courts have not read
Crawford so literally. Rather, these courts rely on the significant
adverse impact on civil rights litigation a $30-per-day cap causes. 9
Reflecting the tension between these two approaches, one court of
appeals which addressed the question en banc, split with a five-to-
five vote.' 0 On February 26, 1990, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the split of authority among the circuits on this
issue.' 1
The article then examines the legislative history and policies
underlying Section 1988. Although these policies justify full recov-
ery of expert witness fees, given the Court's current approach to
federal civil rights legislation, it is unlikely that a majority of the
Court would uphold such a recovery absent further congressional
directive. 12 Finally, the article explores how a civil rights litigant
4. See Ray Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiff's Attorney in Equal Employment
Litigation: A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 Lab. Law. 63, 72 (1989).
5. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982) provides in relevant part: "A judge or clerk of
any court of the United States may tax as costs... (6) Compensation of court ap-
pointed experts."
6. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1982) provides that a witness shall be paid an at-
tendance fee of $30 per day for each day's attendance and for the travel time going
to and returning from the place of attendance. This does not apply to court-ap-
pointed experts.
7. 482 U.S. at 445 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 446 n.1 (Marshall and
Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
8. See iqfra note 47 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
11. West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 58
U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1990) (No. 89-994).
12. There has been no congressional action to amend § 1988 to provide explic-
itly for awarding expert witness fees to prevailing plaintiffs. New legislation intro-
duced in Congress that has addressed the issue of shifting litigation costs in specific
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might, pending congressional action, still recover some portion of
the expenses of an expert witness in excess of the $30-per-day cap.
I. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J T. Gibbons, Inc.
In Crawford,13 the Supreme Court considered consolidated
appeals from two cases from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. In J. T Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co.,14 J.T. Gib-
bons brought an action against Crawford Fitting for alleged viola-
tions of the antitrust laws.15 After a directed verdict in favor of
Crawford, Crawford sought reimbursement from Gibbons for liti-
gation expenses which included substantial expert witness fees.16
The district court, finding that some of the expert testimony was
"indispensible to the determination of [the] issues in [the] case,"17
awarded $86,480.70 for expert witness fees under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d).18 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
the Section 1821 cap was dispositive.19
In International Woodworkers of America, Local No. 5-376 v.
Champion International Corp.,20 IWA brought an action against
Champion for alleged racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.21 After a successful defense, Champion
sought reimbursement for, inter alia, $11,807 in expert witness
fees.22 Although the district court found defendant's expert was
"helpful and perhaps necessary to its case," it declined to award
fees in excess of the $30-per-day cap.2 3 The Fifth Circuit af-
areas has typically specified that costs include attorney's fees and expert witness
fees. See, e.g., S. 2104, H.R. 4000 (Amendment to Civil Rights Act of 1964), 101st
Cong. 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2105 (Amendment of District of Colombia Appropriations
Act), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 1630 (Clean Air Act Amendments), 101st Cong.
2d Sess. (1990); S. 1897, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1879 (Cargo Preference Re-
form), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1089 (Office of Environmental Quality), 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 869 (Capital Gains Deduction), 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); S. 643 (Radon Tax Credit), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 491 (Stratospheric
Ozone and Climate Protection Act), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 322 (American
Conservation and Youth Service Corps Act), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
13. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
14. No. 86-322.
15. 482 U.S. at 438.
16. Id.
17. 102 F.R.D. 73, 86 (E.D. La. 1984)
18. Id. at 90. Rule 54(d) provides in relevant part: "[e]xcept when express pro-
vision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court other-
wise directs."
19. 790 F.2d 1193, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
20. No. 86-328.
21. 482 U.S. at 438.
22. Id.
23. No. WC 78-33-WK-P, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 24, 1983).
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firmed.24 In each of these cases, the prevailing litigants argued
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which provides that
"costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless
the court otherwise directs," 25 granted the court discretion to
award expert witness fees as costs in excess of the Section 1821
cap.26
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court first reviewed
the history of the 1853 Fee Act,27 the precursor to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920,28 which gives federal courts authority to tax specified
items. Before the 1853 Fee Act, taxable costs in most federal cases
depended upon the practice of the state courts of the forum state.29
The Act was passed to eliminate the diversity of practice among
the federal courts, and because "'losing litigants were being un-
fairly saddled with exorbitant fees.' "30 The Act listed certain tax-
able costs, providing that "the following and no other
compensation shall be taxed and allowed."31 The rate for wit-
nesses was set at $1.50 per day.3 2
The words "and no other" do not appear in Section 1920. The
majority in Crawford, however, did not find this absence signifi-
cant and concluded that Section 1920 sets forth the universe of
costs a federal court could tax under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 54(d).
The logical conclusion from the language and interrelation of
[Section 1920, Section 1821, and Rule 54(d)] is that § 1821 speci-
fies the amount of the fee that must be tendered to a witness,
§ 1920 provides that the fee may be taxed as a cost, and Rule
54(d) provides that the cost shall be taxed against the losing
party unless the court otherwise directs.33
The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that Rule 54(d) con-
stituted a separate source of power to tax as costs expenses other
than those enumerated in Section 1920, finding that this interpre-
tation would make Section 1920 superfluous. 34
24. 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
26. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 441.
27. The 1853 Fee Act provided in relevant part, that "in lieu of the compensa-
tion now allowed by law to attorneys, solicitors .... and . .. witnesses ... in the
several states, the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and al-
lowed." Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161.
28. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is set forth supra, at note 5.
29. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 439-40.
30. Id. at 440 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240, 251 (1975)).
31. 10 Stat. 161 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 167.




The Court held that it would "not lightly infer that Congress
has repealed §§ 1920 and 1821, either through Rule 54(d) or any
other provision not referring explicitly to witness fees."3 5 Later in
the opinion, the Court again stated that "absent explicit statutory
or contractual authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a
litigant's witness as costs, federal courts are bound by the limita-
tions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920."36
The dissent, on the other hand, thought the majority's inter-
pretation rendered Rule 54(d) superfluous and stressed the fact
that Section 1920 "does not purport to be exclusive."37 In a foot-
note, Justice Marshall stated that, in his view, the majority did not
decide the question whether a federal district court could award
expert witness fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in excess of the amount
set forth in Section 1821.38 Crawford Fitting was an antitrust case
not involving Section 1988.39 In International Woodworkers,
which had been based in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the prevailing
defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees " 'and expenses'
under Section 1988, and filed a bill of costs under Rule 54(d).40
The bill of costs included over $30,000 for "'expert witness fees
and expenses.' "41 The district court denied the motion for attor-
ney's fees and expenses under Section 1988.42 This order was not
appealed. Later, by separate order,43 the district court denied the
application for expert witness fees under Rule 54(d); the appeal
was only from this order.44 Thus, the issue of recovery under Sec-
tion 1988 was not before the Court.
II. Post-Crawford Response
Lower courts have not agreed on Crawford's effect on award-
ing witness fees in Section 1988 cases. Before Crawford, courts
routinely denied requests made pursuant to Section 1821(b) for ex-
pert witness fees in excess of the $30-per-day cap,45 but allowed re-
covery of full expert witness fees as expenses or attorney's fees
35. Id. at 445.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 449.
38. Id. at 446 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting the record).
41. Id. (quoting the record).
42. Id.
43. No. WC 78-33-WK-P (N.D. Miss. Aug. 24, 1983).
44. 482 U.S. at 446 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Kivi v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 695 F.2d 1285 (11th Cir. 1983);
Quy v. Air Am., Inc., 667 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co.,
657 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1981); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Berkey Photo, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
1990]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 8:341
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other fee-shifting statutes. 46 Since
Crawford, however, several courts have found Section 1988 and
similar civil rights statutes lacking in the explicitness required to
shift the cost of expert witnesses.47 These courts have offered lit-
tle analysis of the issue and support the holdings by focusing on
Crawford's requirement of "explicit statutory authority." 48  In-
deed, under Crawford, the absence of any mention of expert wit-
ness fees in Section 1988 would seem to preclude a finding of
statutory authority, especially when compared with the numerous
fee-shifting provisions in other federal statutes specifically
enumerating witness fees as a recoverable cost. 49
Other courts have declined to read Crawford so literally.
These courts have noted that Congress's purpose in enacting Sec-
tion 1988 was to provide equal access to the courts and to promote
efficient enforcement of civil rights legislation and effective repre-
sentation of persons seeking to vindicate violations of their civil
rights.50 These courts have held that limiting recovery of expert
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Goodwin Bros. Leas-
ing, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 587 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1979).
46. See, e.g., Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983); Berry v.
McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 950 (1981).
47. See West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 32-35 (3d Cir. 1989) ("we
are constrained by the language of Crawford [requiring explicit statutory authority]
... to limit expert witness fees to thirty dollars a day"); Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846
F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir. 1988) (Section 1988 does not authorize award of expert wit-
ness fees in excess of that set forth in § 1821); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468,
474 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Crawford for proposition that prevailing civil rights party
not entitled to tax expert fees as costs), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991 (1988); Catlett v.
Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1272 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding
that in light of Crawford, defendant in § 1983/Title VII case could challenge assess-
ment of class's expert witness fees), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); see also
Denny v. Westfield State College, 880 F.2d 1465, 1471 (1st Cir. 1989) (reserving
question of whether experts' full fee can be shifted even when § 1988 is directly
controlling); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1573-76 (11th Cir.) (the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), does not authorize award of expert
witness fees in excess of amount permitted by § 1821), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 378
(1988); Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 584 (5th Cir. 1987) (Voting Rights
Act does not allow recovery of witness fees), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988).
48. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 445.
49. See, e.g., Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1982); Haz-
ardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1982); Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1982); Noise
Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1982); Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (1982).
50. See Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1989) (Crawford
does not control because "literal interpretation of judicial language is no more de-
fensible than the literal interpretation of statutory language"); Freeman v. Package
Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1347 (1st Cir. 1988) (Crawford may not directly control);
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witness fees to $30 per day would frustrate these purposes.
Perhaps the clearest reflection of the split of opinion on this
issue, as well as an indication of the stakes involved, is the evenly
split vote of the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc in Gilbert v. City of
Little Rock.51 The case represented the final chapter in nearly ten
years of litigation concerning racial discrimination in the Little
Rock, Arkansas, Police Department. The appellants were four po-
lice officers who eventually prevailed on their claim of discrimina-
tory promotional policies brought under Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983.52 The district court calculated attorney's fees to
be awarded the appellants, and awarded them full transcript and
deposition costs and approximately $4,000 for out-of-pocket ex-
penses.53 The appellants also sought $93,946.69 in expert witness
fees and expenses.54 The district court noted that "[u]ntil recently,
the Court would have been inclined to award [the appellants] the
lion's share of the expert witness fees requested" but felt con-
strained by Crawford to limit the recovery of expert witness ex-
penses to $30 per day.55 Accordingly, the district court limited its
award of expert witness fees to $900.00.56 After oral argument in
front of the en banc court, the award of $900.00 was summarily af-
firmed by the vote of an equally divided court.57
III. The American Rule and Section 1988's Fee-Shifting Provision
Under the "American Rule," the prevailing party generally
may not recover expenses incurred to aid the party in preparing
his or her case. 58 This rule has been justified as a means of: (1)
SapaNajin v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1988) (Crawford not applicable be-
cause award of expert's fee "not made as a taxation of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821, but as an expense under 42 U.S.C. § 1988"); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 118 F.R.D. 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Crawford does not preclude an award of
full expert witness fees "[i]n light of past practice, the congressional policy of en-
couraging the assertion of legal rights in civil rights matters as manifested in 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and the adverse impact which a $30-per-day limitation on expert wit-
ness reimbursement would have on such litigation"); cf. Johns v. Whirlpool Corp.,
No. 86-2003 (D. Kan. filed Feb. 4, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file at LEXIS
page 18) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), authorizes award of witness
fees in excess of § 1821 limits because applying this limit would be inconsistent with
the "policy underlying the attorney's fees provisions in discrimination statutes ...
to encourage private persons to bring meritorious actions and provide a public ser-
vice by discouraging and eliminating unlawful discrimination").
51. 867 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
52. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 799 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1986).




57. 867 F.2d at 1062.
58. This is in contrast to the "English Rule" which awards the prevailing party
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guarding against excessive litigation and unreasonable fees gener-
ated in the expectation that the cost will be borne by the losing
party;5 9 (2) protecting those with monetarily small claims from be-
ing discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights
for fear they will be saddled with their opponents' counsel's fees;60
and (3) avoiding the substantial burden of judicial administration
which would result from litigation fees. 61
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,6 2 the
Supreme Court declined to carve a broad exception into the Amer-
ican Rule for attorney's fees. Respondents in Alyeska had insti-
tuted federal litigation to prevent the issuance of government
permits required for construction of a trans-Alaska oil pipeline.6 3
Although legislation eventually terminated the litigation and
granted the permit, 64 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia granted respondents' request for attorney's fees because
they had acted "to vindicate important statutory rights of all citi-
zens whose interests might be affected." 65
In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the "circum-
stances under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the
range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are mat-
ters for Congress to determine." 66 The Court reasoned that Con-
gress's intent, as evidenced in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1923, was to
preserve the American Rule.67 The Court further concluded that
it would be inappropriate for the judiciary, without legislative gui-
dance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation.68
Congress responded swiftly and enacted the fee-shifting pro-
visions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976,69
which later became 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Act authorizes courts to
award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties, unless spe-
his or her counsel fees. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
59. See Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 230-31 (1872).
60. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
61. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718.
62. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
63. Id. at 242-43.
64. Id. at 244 n.11 (citing Pub. L. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 576 (1973) (codified at 30
U.S.C. § 185 (1982)) which amends the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 181-287).
65. 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
66. 421 U.S. at 262.
67. Id. at 255-60.
68. Id. at 263-69.
69. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982)).
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cial circumstances make such an award unjust.70 The legislative
history indicates two justifications for fee-shifting. First, because
civil rights litigants are often poor and judicial remedies are often
non-monetary, shifting litigation costs from civil rights victim to
civil rights violator gives victims effective access to the judicial
process.71 Second, the Act encourages individuals to act as "pri-
vate attorneys general," thereby playing a significant role in the
enforcement of important congressional policies.72 In providing
for the realization of these objectives, Congress recognized that
competent counsel was an essential and critical ingredient.73
Both justifications indicate that all reasonable expenses, in-
cluding the full expense of expert witnesses, should be recoverable
under Section 1988. First, the increasingly complex fact patterns
of civil rights litigation frequently require civil rights attorneys to
make significant out-of-pocket expenditures for assistance from
non-legal experts. If these expenses are not taxable as costs and
the client cannot afford to pay them (as is often the case), they
must be borne by counsel. For example, the successful plaintiffs in
Gilbert incurred $93,946.69 in expert witness fees over an eight-
year period, only $900.00 of which was awarded by the Eighth Cir-
cuit as costs. 74 If counsel is forced to absorb these costs, generally
billable in fee-paid cases, the effect will be to steer attorneys away
from civil rights cases and toward more lucrative types of litiga-
70. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections [1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title], title IX of Public Law 92-318, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
71. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5908, 5909-10 (fee awards are an essential remedy if private
citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights); H.R. Rep.
No. 1558, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 1. (1976) (bill designed to give persons effective access
to the judicial process); 122 Cong. Rec. 31, 471 (1976) (statement of Sen. Mathias)
(goal of bill is to ensure high cost of litigation does not bar access to federal courts
to citizens seeking to enforce their civil rights); 122 Cong. Rec. 31, 472 (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (bill addressed issue of citizen access to the courts, ensuring that
beneficiaries of civil rights have means of enforcing them); see also 122 Cong. Rec.
31,832 (1976) (statement of Sen. Hathaway).
72. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5908, 5910; H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (effective
enforcement depends on efforts of private citizens); 122 Cong. Rec. 31,471 (state-
ment of Sen. Hugh Scott) (Congress should encourage citizens to go to court in pri-
vate suits to vindicate civil rights policies).
73. H.R. Rep. 1558, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1976) (award of reasonable fees en-
sures attraction of competent counsel in civil rights cases); S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5908, 5913 (re-
ferring to prior cases resulting in fees adequate to attract competent counsel).
74. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 709 F. Supp. 856, 861 (E.D. Ark. 1987).
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tion. Decreasing the availability of attorneys restricts a civil rights
plaintiff's effective access to the courts.
Second, although the "private attorney general" theory is
usually discussed in terms of the parties to an action, the often
complex nature of civil rights litigation makes the theory equally
applicable to civil rights counsel. The valuable public service civil
rights litigation performs could not be achieved without the serv-
ices of counsel, who would be severely penalized if they could not
recover the real costs of their services.
Thus, the congressional policies underlying Section 1988 sup-
port extending Section 1988's fee-shifting provision to cover full
expert witness fees. However, since neither Section 1988 itself nor
its legislative history specifically mentions witness expenses, it
does not seem to meet the "explicit statutory authority" require-
ment of Crawford.
The Seventh Circuit, in a recent decision, Friedrich v. City of
Chicago,75 took an ironic approach to this problem by questioning
whether Crawford's own language 76 was to be read literally. Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Posner stated:
Read literally this statement [in Crawford requiring explicit
statutory authorization for the taxation of expert witness fees
as costs] provides strong support for the defendants' argument
[that such fees were not taxable under section 1988], but the
-literal interpretation of judicial language is no more defensible
than the literal interpretation of statutory language.77
Judge Posner went on to reason that, in any event, all Crawford
requires is that Congress's intent to shift full expert witness fees
be clear. Crawford does not require that the statute in question
explicitly contain the words "expert witness fees" or language
which specifically repeals Sections 1920 and 1821.78 An examina-
tion of the purposes of Section 1988 and the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment convinced the Seventh Circuit that
Congress clearly intended that full expert fees could be shifted.79
IV. A Loose Fit?
Even in those circuits where Crawford has already slammed
the door on successful civil rights litigants attempting to recover
full expert witness fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Crawford's holding
may be significantly limited. Civil rights litigators should closely
75. 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)
76. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
77. Id. at 515.
78. Id. at 515-16.
79. Id. at 517-19.
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examine these limits to see if their expert witness fees may qualify
for full or partial reimbursement. Section 1821 specifies the
amount an expert can be paid "for each day's attendance."8 0 Yet,
in the course of preparing and presenting a case, an expert is likely
to spend considerable time engaged in non-testimonial activity
such as identification, collection, analysis, synthesis of data, and
consultations with the attorney 8 ' In this capacity, the expert con-
tributes to the attorney's understanding of the case.
In Missouri v. Jenkins,8 2 a post-Crawford Supreme Court de-
cision interpreting "reasonable attorney's fees" under Section 1988,
the Court stated that a reasonable attorney's fee should encompass
the reasonable fee for the work product of an attorney, taking into
account the work of paralegals, law clerks, others "whose labor
contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her cli-
ent," and "other expenses and profit."8 3 Although Jenkins did not
address expert services, the same rationale applies to that part of
an expert's fees related to providing assistance in preparing the
case, such as educating the attorney on statistical issues.84 Costs
for expert advice and consultation certainly qualify as incidental
and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing effective and com-
petent representation.
Alternatively, a prevailing party may be able to recoup some
costs of an expert's services under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) which allows
reimbursement of "[flees for exemplification and copies of papers
necessarily obtained for use in the case."8 5 A leading commentator
has interpreted this section as covering the reasonable expenses of
preparing demonstrative evidence such as models, graphs, charts,
and photographs.86 Moreover, some courts have construed Section
1920(4) to permit awards of costs for statistical consulting and com-
puter expenses. These cases, however, specifically differentiate be-
tween the expenses of an expert's research and analysis necessary
for preparation of exhibits and surveys presented to the court
(which are reimbursable under Section 1920(4)) and the expenses
associated with the research and analysis necessary for prepara-
80. 28 U.S.C. § 182(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Expert Witnesses' Statements of Professional Services, Appellants'
Addendum, at 29-32, Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, No. 87-2128 (8th Cir. filed Oct.
16, 1987) (expert was required to stay in Little Rock for 17 days during the trial to
work on complex statistical analyses).
82. 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989).
83. Id. at 2470.
84. See Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (1982).
86. 6 James Moore, Walter Taggart & Jeremy Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice
T 54.77(6), at 54-463-54-466 (2d ed. 1988).
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tion of the case for trial (which are not reimbursable under Sec-
tion 1920(4)).87
It should be noted, however, that although prior court ap-
proval is not required for recovery under Section 1920 of justifia-
bly incurred expenses, a party is less likely to recover these costs
absent prior court approval.88 Nonetheless, counsel have occasion-
ally convinced the court to tax these costs despite lack of prior
court approval.8 9
Finally, and probably most significantly, Crawford applies
only to a litigant's attempt to recover expert witness fees under
federal law. At least one federal court has affirmed an award of
expert witness fees in excess of the $30-per-day cap as authorized
under a state cost-shifting statute. In Freeman v. Package Machin-
ery Co.,90 the plaintiff brought and recovered on parallel federal
and state age discrimination claims. The First Circuit discussed
the applicability of Crawford to claims brought under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act,91 but concluded that it did not
have to reach the issue because Massachusetts had enacted its own
cost-shifting statute.92 After analyzing the statute and case law,
the First Circuit found no discernible cap to the plaintiff's recov-
ery under state law and upheld the amount of the award as wholly
within the court's discretion.9 3
Although a few states specifically prohibit recovery of addi-
tional compensation for expert witnesses, 94 twice as many states
87. In re Air Crash Disaster, 687 F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1982); Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220,
1227-28 (7th Cir. 1980). But see Shipes v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 612
(E.D. Tex. 1987) (prevailing civil rights plaintiffs after Crawford not entitled to fees
for out-of-court services performed by experts in analyzing statistical evidence
presented at trial regardless of whether experts testified at trial).
88. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbMH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 713 F.2d
128, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing award for charts, models, and photographs be-
cause no pretrial authorization); Shakey's Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426, 437 (9th Cir.
1983) (surveys not essential to defense).
89. See cases cited supra note 87.
90. 865 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1988).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
92. 865 F.2d at 1346-47 (citing Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, § 9 (1988)) (court shall
award successful employment discrimination petitioner reasonable attorney's fees
and costs unless special circumstances make award unjust).
93. 865 F.2d at 1347-50.
94. ARIZONA: see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-332 (1982) (costs include witness
fees); State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (Ariz. 1960) (no extra recovery
when witness is expert). But cf Rabe v. Cut & Curl of Plaza 75, Inc., 148 Ariz. 552,
715 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (party can recover as costs money paid to oppo-
nent's expert to obtain testimony before trial). CALIFORNIA: see Cal. Gov't Code
§ 68092.5(a) (West 1989) (party employing expert responsible for fees); Posey v.
State, 180 Cal. 3d 836, 225 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (prevailing party not
entitled to recover expert witness fees as costs). KANSAS: see Kan. Stat. Ann.
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specifically permit recovery of expert witness fees in an amount to
be determined by the court.95 Moreover, some states permit a
court to include an expert's time spent in preparation for trial.96
A few states, however, restrict the number of experts whose fees
can be taxed.97
V. Conclusion
Although some federal courts have interpreted Crawford as
foreclosing a successful civil rights litigant's ability to recover full
expert witness fees under the cost-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, Crawford does not mandate such an interpretation. If
§ 60-2003 (1983) (costs include witness fees); Divine v. Groshong, 235 Kan. 127, 679
P.2d 700 (Kan. 1984) (no extra recovery when witness is expert). NEW YORK: see
N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 8301 (McKinney 1981) (costs can be taxed); Board of Educ.
v. Ambach, 90 A.D.2d 227, 458 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (extra fee for ex-
pert not recoverable under Rule 8301 absent extraordinary circumstances). See also
WISCONSIN: see Wis. Stat. § 814.04(2) (Supp. 1989) (recovery of expert witness
fees not to exceed $100 per testifying expert).
95. COLORADO: see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-16-122 (1987) (costs include expert
witness fees); § 13-33-102(4) (1987) (court has discretion to assess amount of expert's
fee); Crawford v. French, 633 P.2d 524 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (expert fees taxed as
costs in adverse possession action). CONNECTICUT: see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-251b
(Supp. 1989) (court can award costs to prevailing civil rights party); § 52-260(f)
(Supp. 1989) (fees of medical witness determined by court and may be taxed as
costs). DELAWARE: see Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8906 (Supp. 1974) (expert witness
fees fixed by court and may be taxed as costs); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 517 A.2d
653 (Del. Ch. 1986) (expert witness fees awarded in shareholder suit). FLORIDA:
see Fla. Stat. § 92-231(2) (1979) (expert witness allowed $10 per hour or amount de-
termined by the court, and fee may be taxed as costs); Thursby v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (taxing costs of expert witness in prod-
ucts liability action). GEORGIA: see Ga. Code Ann. § 9-15-8 (Michie 1982) (witness
fees taxable as costs under some circumstances); Schofield v. Little, 2 Ga. App. 286,
58 S.E. 666 (1907) (although no statute allows or prohibits expert's fees as costs,
physicians can demand more compensation than lay witnesses). ILLINOIS: see Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 68, para. 8-108(G) (1987) (court can tax all or portion of costs of civil
rights action "including... expert witness fees"). MAINE: see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 14 § 1502-C (Supp. 1989) (prevailing party can recover expert witness fees); tit.
16 § 252 (expert's fees to be determined by court). MASSACHUSETTS: see Mass.
Gen. L. ch. 151B, § 9 (1989) (court to award successful civil rights petitioner reason-
able attorney's fees and costs); Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331
(1st Cir. 1988) (no discernible cap; award within court's discretion). NEW MEX-
ICO: see N.M. Stat. Ann § 38-6-4 (Supp. 1987) (court may tax expert witness fee as
costs). VIRGINIA: see Va. Code Ann. § 14.1-178 (1989) (prevailing party may re-
cover costs); § 14.1-190 (taxing of expert's fees in court's discretion).
96. See Yeager Garden Acres, Inc. v. Summit Const. Co., 32 Colo. App. 242, 513
P.2d 458 (1973) (assessment under Colorado statute can consider expert's prepara-
tion time); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-6-4 (Supp. 1987) (authorizing court to consider com-
pensation for expert's time to prepare and investigate before testifying).
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-6-4 (Supp. 1987) (restricting taxable witness fees to one
liability expert and one damage expert, unless court determines otherwise); Va.
Code Ann. § 14.1-194 (1989) (court may restrict number of witnesses whose fees will
be taxed).
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Crawford's requirement of "explicit statutory authority" is read to
include authority as expressed in legislative history, then the justi-
fications underlying Section 1988 indicate full expert witness fees
should be recoverable thereunder. In any event, Crawford does
not foreclose the possibility of recovering the costs of some of an
expert's services under other federal statutes or full expert wit-
ness fees under some state cost-shifting statutes.
